I spoke this week with Anatol Lieven, Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, about what he calls the “mutual delusion” driving both sides of the Ukraine war. He writes, “Hardliners on both sides in the Ukraine war are pursuing a chimaera in the hope of a miracle.”
Lieven adds:
“It is hard to know what would be worse: if we are being deliberately lied to, or if these retired officers and security ‘experts’ heralding imminent victory for Ukraine actually believe this nonsense. Most probably, the political, bureaucratic, media, academic and think tank consensus in Europe has now become so monolithic and absolute that they do believe it, since nobody is saying anything different ...
“The situation on the battlefield in eastern Ukraine now resembles the stalemate on the Western Front in 1916 ...”
“There is a sort of delirium in Europe,” he told me. Please give our interview a listen. A (lightly edited) transcript is below.
Link:
“Mutual Delusion,” August 7 2026:
https://newleftreview.org/sidecar/posts/mutual-delusion
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Transcript
[begins with intro excerpt]
Richard Eskow: Let’s start with your piece that was published about a week ago, headlined “Mutual Delusion,” which begins: “Hardliners on both sides in the Ukraine war are pursuing a chimera in the hope of a miracle.” You went on to say briefly that Moscow seems to hope Ukraine’s defenses will collapse.
First of all, is that still your summary of the situation, that there is a sort of chimerical pursuit on both sides?
Anatol Lieven: Yes, I think so. Not, of course, among sensible analysts in either Moscow or Kyiv, but undoubtedly there are highly influential hardliners, including, it seems, among the Russian generals, who do hope that somehow the situation will be miraculously transformed in their favor.
I would say that if the Russians go on and on and on slogging away, and if they’re capable of continuing to slog away, they have a better chance, not of a complete victory, which is impossible now for Russia, but of a greater victory than Ukraine does. But the Russian advance on the ground for the past three years has been agonizingly slow. Casualties have been enormous. The Ukrainians, in my view, have actually succeeded. They’ve won a great victory simply by slowing the Russians down and preserving more than 80 percent of Ukrainian territory. But unfortunately, and unfortunately encouraged by some of their Western supporters, they have been holding out for terms that Russia will never concede to.
There’s one Russian demand which I understand very well, and which every Ukrainian says to me no Ukrainian government can agree to, and that is withdrawal from the remainder of the Donbas region that Ukraine still holds. But Ukraine is also trying to, well, the Ukrainian government, at least, not, I think, a great many ordinary Ukrainians or even some more sensible members of the Ukrainian elite, the Ukrainian government is still demanding the right to join NATO, the right to have European troops on Ukrainian soil, and refusing to grant any language protections to the Russian language in Ukraine.
Basically, if those positions are maintained, just as, on the other side, if Putin’s demand for the rest of the Donbas is maintained, they rule out a compromise. So do the positions adopted not just by the Ukrainians, but by the European Union as well.
Eskow: And I think before we get into the delusions, precisely what those are, and you’ve begun to outline them, I also want to give you my impression, and you tell me where I’m right or wrong.
If I recall correctly, within the first year of this war, both the U.S. head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the top military officer in this country, and his equivalent in Ukraine seemed to agree that it was more or less a morass, that it was a stalemate, I believe, is the word that was used. And since then we’ve seen enormous, it seems to me, resourcefulness on the part of the Ukrainians in adapting and using drone technology and other, perhaps unexpected, strategies to resist. But still, years later, it seems to me that the assessment those two generals made, perhaps it was early 2023, is still essentially the same.
Am I wrong about that?
Lieven: No, you’re absolutely right. And the tragedy, and I would say also the profound culpability, of the Biden administration and European governments as well was that, instead of being willing to recognize that reality, they went on demanding that Russia withdraw from and hand back all the territory in Ukraine that it had conquered, not just since the start of the war, which actually, in the peace talks at the start of the war, Russia offered to do, but since 2014, including Crimea.
Well, there was no way that any Russian government could possibly agree to that. What they were basically saying was: There is going to be no peace settlement. Our goal is complete Ukrainian victory, although their own, as you say, best military experts and leaders had told them that that was exceptionally unlikely to happen.
Eskow: And there’s another dimension of this conflict that concerns me that never seems to get, I shouldn’t say never, rarely seems to get discussed in the mainstream media in the West, at least that I’ve seen.
And it’s this: There’s a lot of talk about Ukraine’s possible victory, or partial victory, or whatever. But what seems to be left out of those equations is that they’re assuming this remains a ground war, a war of inches as it is now, and disregarding the fact that Russia has the capability, as horrific as it might be, to escalate. If Russia doesn’t want to give something up and they’re struggling to win it on the battlefield, they have missiles, they have tactical nuclear weapons, they have all sorts of weapons of mass destruction.
In a sense, it almost feels as if, I’m sure this isn’t the case, but as one who’s been attacked as a so-called Putin apologist myself for suggesting a peaceful end to this war, it seems to me they have a more benevolent view of Putin’s intentions than I do. Because it seems to me that either he or his generals might, at some point, insist on escalating this war if it doesn’t go their way, in ways that would be tragic and potentially destabilizing at levels we can’t even imagine yet.
Am I being melodramatic about this?
Lieven: No, because this is what Russian hardliners have been urging Putin to do. But so far, he has always rejected that. I’ve talked to people who formerly advised Putin, and they say Putin knows perfectly well that to threaten really credibly to use nuclear weapons, in the hope that the West would back down and abandon Ukraine or force Ukraine to make a peace settlement on Russian terms, would require that if the West refused, Putin would actually use nuclear weapons.
Well, at that point, of course, not only would Russia be utterly discredited in the eyes of the entire world, including the Chinese, who have warned very strongly against this, but it would invite, indeed could almost compel, Western nuclear attacks on Russia, which would, of course, lead to universal catastrophe. Putin, I think, knows that perfectly well.
The risk is not of an intentional, deliberate use of nuclear weapons, but that there will be some kind of clash which will then lead to escalation, and both sides will be trapped into a path toward full-scale war between NATO and Russia, which neither side actually wants. That is why I always say the situation now is more like, it’s not like Europe before 1939, when Hitler was planning universal domination. Putin has no such agenda. It’s much more like the situation before 1914—
Eskow: Right.
Lieven: —in which all the states concerned thought that they were acting rationally and defending vital national interests, but the result was still catastrophe.
Now, for an example of the kind of clash that could lead to such escalation, as you know, for a year or more now, sometimes the Americans but more often the Europeans and British have been seizing ships with Russian cargoes, the so-called Russian shadow fleet. Now, this has absolutely no sanction from the United Nations. If any country were to do that to us, we would describe it as piracy, which is what not just the Russians but the Indians and the Chinese describe it as.
Well, so far Russia has not retaliated against that, of course, above all because Russia is wholly, totally outclassed at sea by NATO navies. But Putin has now threatened that if the Europeans continue to do this, Russia will start seizing European ships, not, of course, American ones, and perhaps not even British or French ones, but ships belonging to smaller European navies. That, of course, will cause a huge crisis and, on top of the war in the Gulf, a surge in maritime insurance rates.
If, of course, you then have a military intervention by European navies to stop that, then there is a chance, a really strong chance, of something which, thank God, we have managed to avoid for four and a half years, which is a direct military clash between NATO and Russia.
Eskow: And in trying to understand NATO’s position in this, and I understand that, well, first of all, NATO is essentially an artifact of the Cold War, and that it was U.S.-led for many years, it seems now that NATO is not a unitary organization by any means anymore, and that Western Europe and its members may have a slightly different agenda.
It seemed as if they had a dramatically different agenda from Donald Trump when he came into office. Joe Biden seemed to be a leading belligerent when it came to Russia and Ukraine. Trump was telling a different story about how it wasn’t America’s war and that sort of thing. Now it seems as if the leading advocates for ongoing war may be in Western Europe, and Trump is sort of going along with it. Is that your understanding?
Lieven: Pretty much. Of course, the Trump administration is completely distracted now by the war that it launched against Iran. But also, it did try pretty hard to bring the two sides to an agreement, but it could not get the Ukrainians, the Europeans, or the Russians to give up demands that were simply unacceptable to the other side.
But, of course, in addition, America is now selling weapons to the Europeans to give to the Ukrainians. America is providing absolutely critically important satellite intelligence and targeting intelligence to the Ukrainians. But this war is not now actually costing America anything, except, of course, in terms of higher international oil prices. Trump, at the moment, seems content that this war should simply trundle on as long, of course, as it doesn’t escalate in ways that threaten the United States.
It should be said, though, that the Europeans themselves are divided. Southern European countries are much less committed to Ukraine than are some of the Eastern Europeans and Scandinavians. The Scandinavians, of course, at the same time are looking over their shoulders with deep fear because of Trump’s threats to Greenland, which would, of course, if implemented, split NATO down the middle.
And then you have, within European countries, both right-wing and left-wing oppositions that are opposed to further aid to Ukraine. And we have to see, it won’t change the government in Germany, but we have to see what happens in two German, or East German, state elections next month and how successful AfD, the right-wing populist party, is.
But above all, next spring there are presidential elections in France. If Marine Le Pen and Rassemblement National win, I think there could be real French opposition to continuing aid to Ukraine at the present level. The key, the absolute vulnerability of Ukraine compared to Russia, is that, in effect, Ukraine’s entire state budget and by far the greater part of its war effort are being paid for by the European Union and Britain.
If that aid is stopped or significantly reduced, Ukraine will either have to agree to Russian terms or will be defeated. Russia, for its part, although Ukraine has done some serious economic damage, still pays for its own war effort. That gives it, in the long run, a critical potential advantage over Ukraine.
Eskow: Because it’s not dependent on the largesse of some third party.
Lieven: Exactly.
Eskow: Speaking of Western Europe and third parties, as you know, last month was Bastille Day in France, and French President Emmanuel Macron declared on that occasion that Europeans were ready to defend their continent, and I quote, obviously in translation, “with blood if necessary.” And he brought together 25 leaders to show their support for Ukraine.
I must admit, I don’t get shocked by a lot. I was shocked by the vehemence, a little bit shocked by the vehemence, of Macron’s rhetoric. And I’m not sure what precisely they think they’re defending themselves against. Are they seriously thinking that Ukraine is the first front, and then the Russians want to roll through and take Paris?
What is this about exactly? Can you help me understand?
Lieven: Well, there is a sort of delirium in Europe. You see everybody in the establishment, not just in government and in the administration and bureaucracy and the security services, but in the great majority of the media and the think tanks. Indeed, in Britain, every think tank and all the media are saying exactly the same thing. And this being so, a lot of people, including politicians, believe it because they’re not hearing anything else.
Now, of course, behind a lot of this is the belief, which is not unfounded, and which has, of course, been assiduously stoked by the armed forces themselves, that European countries have allowed their armed forces to decline to a very great extent, even to a potentially dangerous extent. And you need to spend more money on them. But, of course, money is very tight.
How do you get European publics and European parliaments and political parties to support more money for the military, even if this requires cuts in health services and social welfare? Well, you’ve got to persuade them that if you don’t, the Russian bear will come and eat their children.
Eskow: Right.
Lieven: Now, that said, if Macron meant by that that European countries would have to fight if NATO itself is attacked, well, that is what NATO is for.
Eskow: Right.
Lieven: If they are not prepared to do that, you might as well wind up NATO now. But, of course, Ukraine is not a member of NATO. If, as European hardliners are urging, he means that Europe should send troops to fight in Ukraine, that’s a totally different matter.
European publics are strongly against this in general. Most European governments have said no to it, including even the Poles and the Germans. And Le Pen’s party, Rassemblement National, has said categorically it will never send French troops to fight in Ukraine.
The British go on talking about this, but last year the former head of the British Army, General Dannatt, pointed out that the British Army is now so small that to send just one brigade to Ukraine permanently would basically mean using the entire deployable British Army, which, by the way, would mean there were no British troops left over to defend existing NATO members in the Baltic, for example, which, of course, is ridiculous.
Much of this is hot air. But it’s still dangerous, because every time a Western leader says these kinds of things, it strengthens the arguments of hardliners in Moscow—
Eskow: Right.
Lieven: —that Europe is implacably hostile to Russia, and there is no point in seeking any kind of settlement in Ukraine because the Europeans will never agree to it, and therefore the only thing to aim for is military victory.
Eskow: And speaking of NATO and the obligations of NATO countries when attacked, I think that concern for me was heightened a little bit.
We’re speaking on August 13th. On August 10th, it was reported that a Ukrainian drone attack hit the city of, I’m going to try to pronounce this right, Nizhny Komsomolsk, Russia, which is well beyond the front lines. At least 13 people were killed, according to initial reports, and 39 or 40 others wounded. They struck civilian and industrial sites. There’s also an oil refinery there. There’s talk of a child being killed.
Obviously, one fear is that, you know, a stray attack striking a school, as happened in Tehran, might escalate things dramatically. But the other is the concern that the more, and the more boldly, Ukraine attacks deep into Russian territory, killing Russian civilians as part of a NATO-backed effort, that may spark a direct response.
I think Putin may have even threatened a direct response to NATO. But doesn’t that, it strikes me as a highly risky strategy.
Lieven: Well, yes. You only have to turn it around. If the territory of the United States itself were being attacked by somebody’s missiles provided by Russia or China, and to a great extent targeted by Russia and China, well, you can imagine, of course, the United States would retaliate directly against those countries.
It would never accept for a single second that those countries were neutral or not parties to the war. Of course, Russia has not retaliated directly because the Russians are desperately anxious that NATO should not intervene directly on the side of Ukraine. But as you said, there is always the risk of some catastrophic accident that would compel Putin to respond militarily against NATO.
Now, that said, of course, you can’t blame the Ukrainians for bombarding Russia. Russia has been bombarding Ukraine for four and a half years now.
Eskow: Sure.
Lieven: But Ukraine is at war with Russia. We are not at war with Russia. And indeed, all our governments have said repeatedly that they do not want to go to war with Russia.
Well, if they’re sincere about that, there is a case for them being a great deal more careful. Because, as you said, if a Ukrainian missile goes astray and kills a couple hundred Russian schoolchildren, Putin will, I think, attack NATO targets. Not in Britain or France, but in the Baltic States, especially because the Russians believe that the Balts have been allowing Ukrainian drones to fly over their territory on the way to attack St. Petersburg.
I don’t know whether that is actually true, but what is certainly true is that, until recently, they did nothing to stop this happening.
Eskow: And Ukraine is also, since we mentioned Tehran a couple of times, has also now intercepted an Iranian vessel bound for Russia, as I understand it. Some people have said this may have been a strategy on Ukraine’s part to position itself as essentially a military ally of the United States in the Iran war.
What did you make of that action?
Lieven: Well, on the one hand, Iran has been supplying Russia, not, of course, since the American-Israeli attack on Iran, but previously they were supplying Russia with Shahed drones, for example. But it is also true that, for very understandable Ukrainian reasons, since the start of the Russian invasion the Ukrainian government has been doing everything it can to drag the U.S. and NATO into a direct confrontation with Russia.
Now, NATO has always backed away from that. And partly, of course, because Putin’s nuclear bluster has been completely, or deliberately, I would say, often misrepresented in the West. He’s not been threatening to use nuclear weapons simply for the sake of it. And indeed, I don’t believe there is any chance of Russia using nuclear weapons in Ukraine unless NATO troops appear there.
But the point of these nuclear threats is precisely to deter NATO from taking a direct part in the Ukraine war. But I think one thing is certain: If NATO did join the war and it looked as if Russia was facing defeat, well, that’s what Russian, you know, it’s no different from us during the Cold War.
The U.S. nuclear deterrent was there to be used if it seemed that we were being defeated on the ground by Soviet conventional forces. No different with the Russians. If they see themselves facing defeat on their own borders in Ukraine, then yes, they will use nuclear weapons.
Eskow: And maybe to wrap up, Anatol, it seems to me that, to summarize the history as I see it, and you, of course, correct me if you think I’m wrong, there was a lot of provocation of various kinds leading up to this.
I think this war could have been avoided. That said, Ukraine is the wronged party here. They were illegally invaded by Russia. That said, there are only so many ways out of it, and those appear only to be reachable through negotiation. And it doesn’t seem as if negotiation is on anyone’s agenda right now.
Perhaps it would be on Ukraine’s agenda if they understood that the West was not going to support them in an indefinite war that was mainly killing Ukrainians. Certainly a peaceful settlement in that case would be better. But it seems to me as if the only solutions are ones that are not politically acceptable among any of the involved parties at this point.
Is that accurate?
Lieven: Well, I do not know. Most of the Russians say that the demand for the whole of the Donbas is non-negotiable. Well, certainly that’s what the hardliners believe.
It has been suggested to me that if the West were to offer, and Ukraine were to offer, serious compromises on other key issues, because, of course, a lot of this is about being able to present, and this is true for Zelensky as well as Putin, the eventual settlement as a victory for Russia or for Ukraine.
If we perhaps, and I don’t guarantee it by any means, but perhaps if we were to give Putin enough things in other areas that he could declare victory, perhaps he would give up this impossible demand. On the other side, Russia will never accept that Ukraine be in NATO. This has to be explicitly ruled out in any peace settlement.
Because that was the key reason why Russia went to war. If Russia accepts that, it accepts defeat. Well, the former and most successful Ukrainian military commander, General Zaluzhnyi, who was pushed out by Zelensky and is now ambassador to London, said last week: Look, Ukraine is never going to get into NATO because Western countries will never fight for us. This is meaningless. Let us seek alternatives.
Well, he is a very influential voice. If the war continues into next year, as I fear it will, and if Russian attacks, as they are doing, do terrible damage to Ukrainian electricity, and the Ukrainian population has a very hard winter, and millions more people, of course, flee and emigrate to the West, it could be that by next spring you’ll have a situation in which the Ukrainian government will be willing to offer compromises on wider issues.
But it is essential then that the Europeans also come on board. And, of course, the United States and the U.S. Senate, because what the Russians are afraid of, and with very good reason, given what the Trump administration has done in the past, and, of course, they think Clinton as well, is that any agreement made today could be torn up by a U.S. administration after 2028.
They want a consensus between all the Western powers, and they want something signed and sealed. That will be very, very, very difficult. But, as I say, if the whole Ukrainian position does seem to be crumbling, then perhaps, perhaps it will be possible. But not, I think, this year.
It will take another dreadful winter. It will take tens of thousands more deaths on both sides.
Eskow: Well, it’s tragic that it’s come to this. But as always, Lieven, Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, thanks for your excellent research and analysis, and thank you for coming on the program.
Lieven: Thank you. It was a great pleasure.
So, in other words, between a rock and a hard place. But asking the Trump administration to exhibit competent statecraft or any consistency whatsoever is asking a lot.